Katzenpost Mix Network End-to-end Protocol Specification

Yawning Angel
George Danezis
Claudia Diaz
Ania Piotrowska
David Stainton
Version 0


This is a specification for the Katzenpost/LEAP mix network client end to end protocol and egress mix behavior. The mix network specification is described in Katzenpost Mix Network Specification [KATZMIXNET]. The protocols used by mixes to publish their identities is described in the Katzenpost Mix Network PKI Specification [KATZMIXPKI].

1. Introduction

Fundamentally a mix network is a lossy packet switching network on which we can build reliable protocols. We therefore utilize a variety of ideas from both the mix network and classical internet protocol literature to design an end to end reliability protocol that utilizes the mix network.

1.1. Terminology

  • ACK - A protocol acknowledgment of a previously sent Block.

  • ARQ - Automatic Repeat reQuest is an error correction method which requires two-way communication and incurs a delay penalty when used.

  • Classes of traffic - We distinguish the following classes of traffic:

    • ACKs

    • Forward messages

  • Block - A fragment of a message that fits into a single packet of a specified class of traffic.

  • Block ID - A unique identifier for a Block.

  • Client - Software run by the human being on its local device.

  • E2E Encrypted message - An encrypted message.

  • Message - A variable size end-to-end message, transmitted from one location to another. The message can be classified into one of the classes of traffic, depending on the message size, and transported as a single packet or divided into several packets.

  • Message ID - A unique identifier for a message.

  • Mix - A server that provides anonymity to clients by accepting messages encrypted to its public key, which it then decrypts, delays for a given amount of time, and transmits either to another mix or to a provider (as specified in the messages). Those operations provide bitwise unlinkability between input and output messages as well as long term correlation resistance.

  • Provider - The provider is a client’s single point of failure for participating in the mix network because it is responsible for authorising sent messages as well as storing received messages on behalf of the user. Provider MUST perform the same cryptographic operations as the Mix.

  • Packet - A Sphinx packet.The Katzenpost system supports multiple packet sizes for different classes of traffic. In particular:

    • XKB-block: XX KB (to-do: specify the number of KB)

    • YKB-block: YY KB (to-do: specify the number of KB/MB)

  • SURB-ACK - A short message notifying that a packet was delivered; transmitted via a Single Use Reply Block [SPHINX].

  • SURB_SIZE = sizeof(SphinxSURB) where SphinxSURB is a Single Use Reply Block defined in the “Sphinx Mix Network Cryptographic Packet Format Specification”.

1.2 Conventions Used in This Document

The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

The “C” style Presentation Language as described in [RFC5246] Section 4 is used to represent data structures, except for cryptographic attributes, which are specified as opaque byte vectors.

  • byte - An 8-bit octet.

1.3 Constants

  • BLOCK_LENGTH - The maximum payload size of a block (message fragment). The value of BLOCK-LENGTH depends on the class of traffic.

2. Mix Network Packet Format Considerations

As the mix network message packet format we use Sphinx, as specified: “Sphinx Mix Network Cryptographic Packet Format Specification”, [SPHINXSPEC].

The Sphinx cryptographic primitives and parameters are specified in Section 3 of: “The Katzenpost Mix Network Specification”, [KATZMIXNET].

3. Client and Provider Core Protocol

All client mixnet interaction happens through their Provider, reusing the existing trust relationship any given user may have with an e-mail service provider, and all client to Provider interaction will use the Katzenpost Mix Network Wire Protocol, described in “Katzenpost Mix Network Wire Protocol Specification”, [KATZMIXWIRE].

3.1 Handshake and Authentication

Let the contents of the wire protocol AuthenticateMessage’s additional_data field consist of the local-part component of a client’s e-mail address if the client is authenticating, padded with NUL bytes to exactly 64 bytes in length.

In the case that the authenticating party is a Provider instance, let the additional_data field contain the domain name that the Provider is responsible for mail for.

3.2 Client Retrieval of Queued Messages

Clients periodically poll their Provider for messages that may have been enqueued in that user’s mailbox. All wire protocol commands including these defined commands MUST come after the above described handshake and authentication. We define two additional wire protocol commands:

enum {
    /* Extending the wire protocol Commands. */
} Command;

The structures of these commands are defined as follows:

struct {
    uint32_t sequence_number;
} RetrieveMessage;

enum {
} message_type;

struct {
    opaque surb_id[SURB_ID_LENGTH];
    opaque encrypted_payload[SURB_PAYLOAD_LENGTH];
} Ack;

struct {
    opaque encrypted_payload[PAYLOAD_LENGTH];
    opaque padding[sizeof(Ack) - PAYLOAD_LENGTH];
} MessageCiphertext;

struct {
    message_type type;
    uint8_t queue_size_hint;
    uint32 sequence_number;
    select (message_type) {
        case ack:    Ack;
        default:     MessageCiphertext;
} Message;

3.2.1 The retrieve_message and message Commands

Once a client is connected to the Provider and has entered the data transfer phase after completing the handshake and authentication, the client may start to retrieve messages from the provider via issuing the retrieve_message command.

The retrieve_message command contains a sequence number which the client initially sets to 0 at the beginning of each session. This sequence number is incremented each time the client receives a message from the provider (as a message command), except if the message_type is empty indicating that the client’s inbound message queue is empty, as no message has been received.

Clients MUST NOT have more than one outstanding retrieve_message command at a given time.

The Provider MUST respond to retrieve_message commands, in the following manner:

  1. Validate that the sequence_number is in the expected range, and that there are no other retrieve_message commands originating from a particular session being serviced. If the sequence_number is unexpected, or the client is issuing multiple retrieve_message commands, the session MUST be terminated.

  2. If the sequence_number has been incremented, indicating that the client has received the last message reply, remove the 0th message from the client’s message queue and delete it securely.

  3. Send a message command as a response, with the following values for the Message fields (as the command’s payload).

    • type - The type of the message that is being transported.

    • queue_size_hint - The size of the client’s inbound message queue, excluding the message currently being sent, clamped to 255.

    • sequence_number - The sequence number of the retrieve_message.

If the 0th message is a SURB-ACK:

  • surb_id - The SURB’s identifier taken from the SURBReplyCommand in the Sphinx packet header that delivered the SURB.

    If the message type empty, a MessageCiphertext is still embedded in the Message structure, however the contents MUST be zero filled (filled with 0x00 bytes).

Clients MAY use the queue_size_hint to determine if additional retreive_message commands should be issued soon, or if they can delay the next retreive_message under the assumption that the queue is empty.

Providers SHOULD attempt to service retrieve_message commands in a timely manner.

4. Client and Provider processing of received packets

This section describes the protocol that reliably transmits messages across the mix network to the destination Provider.

It is assumed that all clients have a long lived X25519 keypair, the public component of which is known in advance to all peers who wish to communicate securely with them. How to distribute such keying information is beyond the scope of this document.

Messages begin at the sender as byte strings containing an e-mail in the Internet Message Format (IMF) [RFC5322].


Should we make clients set any header fields, or reserve header fields for use by the recipient?)

Preparing a message for transport takes the following steps:

  1. The message is fragmented into block(s).

    The block structure is as follows:

    struct {
        opaque message_id[16];
        uint16_t total_blocks;
        uint16_t block_id;
        uint32_t block_length;
        opaque block[block_length];
        opaque padding[BLOCK_LENGTH-block_length]; /* 0x00s */
    } Block;


    • message_id - A unique identifier, consistent across all Block(s) belonging to a given message.

    • total_blocks - The number of Block(s) that make up the fully reassembled message.

    • block_id - The sequence number of the Block as a component of a stream of Block(s) making up a message, starting at 0.

    • block_length - The length of the Block’s message fragment.

    • block - The Block’s message fragment.

    • padding - Padding, applied to the terminal Block.

    The padding if any MUST contain 0x00s (ie: be zero padded).

    The message_id SHOULD be trivially collision resistant, and SHOULD NOT be reused while there is a possibility that the recipient can end up Block(s) belonging to multiple messages with a colliding message_id.

  2. Encrypt and authenticate each block.

    Each Block is encrypted and authenticated as a Noise protocol [NOISE] handshake plus transport message, using the recipient’s long term X25519 public key, the sender’s long term X25519 keypair, and a freshly generated ephemeral X25519 keypair.

    Noise_X_25519_ChaChaPoly_Blake2b is used as the Noise protocol name and parameterization for the purpose of Block encryption.

    Let the encrypted and authenticated Block be referred to as the following:

    struct {
        /* Noise protocol fields. */
        opaque noise_e[32];     /* The Noise handshake `e`. */
        opaque noise_s_mac[16]; /* The Noise handshake `s` MAC. */
        opaque noise_s[32];     /* The Noise handshake `s`. */
        opaque noise_mac[16];   /* The Noise ciphertext MAC. */
        opaque ciphertext[BLOCK_LENGTH];
    } BlockCiphertext;
  3. Derive the path(s) and delays for each block.

    Prior to the creation of the Sphinx packet(s) that will transport each message, it is necessary to pre-calculate the forward and optional return path(s), for each BlockCiphertext and it’s optional associated SURB-ACK.

    While the sender’s provider is not, strictly speaking a “mix”, it will apply Sphinx packet processing as if it is a mix, and therefore MUST have a delay.

    The recipient’s provider MUST NOT have a delay.

    See Section 5.1 and Section 5.2 for details.

  4. (Optional) Create the SURB-ACK’s Single Use Reply Block for each block.

    To allow for reliable transmission we use acknowledgments encapsulated in the Single-User Reply Blocks (SURB) of the Sphinx packet format (see “The Sphinx Packet Format Specification”). We refer to these as SURB-ACKs.

    In order to create a SURB-ACK the Client uses the input obtained from the PKI with all the addresses and public keys of the nodes, where nodes include both providers and mixes.

    The new path and set of delays for each SURB-ACK are selected independently following Step 4.

    This SURB-ACK is included in the Sphinx packet of the forward message, in the payload that is received by the egress provider.

  5. Assemble each BlockCiphertext and (Optional) SURBs into Sphinx packet payload.

    Let the Sphinx packet payload consist of the following:

    struct {
       uint8_t flags;
       uint8_t reserved; /* Set to 0x00. */
       select (flags) {
       case 0:
           opaque padding[sizeof(SphinxSURB)];
       case 1:
           SphinxSURB surb;
       BlockCiphertext ciphertext[];
    } BlockSphinxPlaintext;

    All non-terminal hops MUST have a NodeDelayCommand and NextNodeHopCommand command in the per-hop routing command vector.

    The terminal hop for all forward Sphinx packets MUST have a recipient command in the per-hop routing command vector containing the recipient’s identifier (the local-part of the recipient’s e-mail address).

    The terminal hop of all SURB-ACKs MUST have a recipient command in the per-hop command vector containing the sender’s identifier, and additionally have a surb_reply command containing the ID of the SURB.

  6. Send each Sphinx packet via the send_packet command.

    Each Sphinx packet is then send out via the sender’s Provider into the mixnet, using the send_packet wire protocol command.

    The sender SHOULD impose a random delay between each packet, and if the sender chooses to implement this functionality such delay MUST be factored into the path and delay derivation done in step 3.

  7. (Optional) Retransmit lost blocks as needed.

    If the SURB-ACK functionality is used, the sender will receive a SURB, containing an ACK, per block from the recipient’s provider signalling that the Sphinx packet has arrived, was successfully processed, and queued for delivery to the recipient.

    As the sender specifies all mixing delays in advance, the time that a SURB-ACK should arrive for any given block is known to reasonable accuracy in advance.

    If the sender determines that a Sphinx packet was lost (for example by the lack of a SURB-ACK at around the expected time, factoring in potential additional network delays), it SHOULD retransmit the block. The exact ARQ strategy used to determine when a block is considered lost, and which blocks to retransmit is left up to the implementation, however the following rules MUST be obeyed:

    • All retransmitted blocks MUST be re-encrypted, and have a entirely new set of paths and delays. In simple terms, this means re-doing the packet creation/transmission from step 2 for each retransmitted block.

    • Senders MUST NOT retransmit blocks at a rate faster than one block per 3 seconds.

    • Retransmissions must NOT have predictable timing otherwise it exposes the destination Provider to discovery by a powerful adversary that can perform active confirmation attacks.

    • Senders MUST NOT attempt to retransmit blocks indefinitely, and instead give up on the entire message after it fails to arrive after a certain number of retransmissions.

4.1 Provider Behavior for Receiving Messages from the Mix Network

All Providers MUST accept inbound connections from the final layer of the mix network, and receive Sphinx packets. Upon receiving a Sphinx packet, the provider MUST do the following things:

  1. Unwrap the Sphinx packet.

    All unwrapped packets MUST have at least a recipient command in the per-hop command vector specifying which client the packet is destined for.

    Providers MUST discard all packets that are either missing recipient information, or that are addressed to unknown recipients with no additional processing.

  2. Handle the unwrapped packet.

    Iff the Sphinx packet did not have a surb_reply command in the per-hop command vector, then the payload MUST be interpreted as a BlockSphinxPlaintext as follows:

    1. The Provider queues the packet’s ciphertext field for later delivery to the client (via the retrieval mechanism specified in section 3.2).

    2. After the ciphertext has been queued into persistent storage, the Provider MUST generate the ack’s payload, concatenate with the received SURB-ACK header and transmit a SURB-ACK, iff the BlockSphinxPlaintext’s flags is equal to 1, and a valid SURB is present in the payload.

      The SURB-ACK payload MUST be completely zero filled (contain only 0x00 bytes).

      Providers MUST NOT generate and transmit a SURB-ACK unless the ciphertext has been successfully queued for delivery.

      Iff the Sphinx packet has a surb_reply command in the per-hop command vector, then the entire Sphinx packet payload, along with the surb_id value from the surb_reply command is queued for later delivery to the client.

4.2 Client Receive Message Behavior

Clients periodically poll their Provider with a retreive_message command. This section describes the client behavior upon receiving messages from their Provider, based on type.

4.2.1 Client Message Processing

When a client receives an inbound message from their provider, denoted as such by virtue of not being a SURB payload, the ciphertext will contain a BlockCiphertext, that is first decrypted as per the Noise protocol using the private component of their long term X25519 keypair, into a Block.

It is then each client’s responsibility to:

  • Queue, and reassemble multi-block messages as necessary based on the BlockCiphertext s field (sender’s long term public key), and the message_id, total_blocks, and block_id fields in the Block structure.

    When reassembling messages, the values of s, message_id, and total_blocks are fixed for any given distinct message. All differences in those fields across Blocks MUST be interpreted as the Blocks belonging to different messages.

    It is important to keep in mind that both the message and ACK delivery mechanisms are fundamentally unreliable, and that it is possible to receive blocks containing identical payload in the event of a spurious transmission. Clients MUST validate that such Blocks (overlapping block_id) are in fact spurious retransmissions by doing a bitwise compare of the block payloads, and take appropriate action such as warning the user if an anomaly is detected.

  • Present the IMF format message to the user.

    Clients MUST discard messages that fail to authenticate or decrypt, and MUST warn the user at a minimum, if the long term public key used by the sender to encrypt messages is different from a previously known value.

    Clients MAY impose a reasonable deadline for the reassembly process, after which partially received messages are discarded.


    XXX/ya: Should we mandate that clients insert something like: X-Katzenpost-Sender: <Base64(s)> as a header?

5. Sphinx Packet Composition Considerations

Here we describe important facets of how clients construct Sphinx packets. This section assumes the client interacts with the mix network PKI as well as a universal time facility, the constraints of which have been specified in detail in our PKI specification [KATZMIXPKI].

5.1 Choosing Delays: for single Block messages and for multi Block messages

The Client generates a delay for the ingress provider and for each of the mixes in the route, though not for the egress provider. The delays for each mix hop are drawn from the exponential distribution independently for each node. For a class of traffic TRAFFIC_X, the parameter LAMBDA_X (also known as μ in the Loopix paper), which is the inverse of the mean of the exponential distribution in milliseconds, is published by the mix network PKI and the same for all clients. Given LAMBDA_X, the sender just draws a random value from Exp(μ). The frequency of sending messages weather they be forward messages or decoy drops, is controlled by the parameter known as LAMBDA_P (aka λ_P) in the loopix paper [LOOPIX], which is the inverse of the mean of the exponential distribution in milliseconds.


XXX/ya: Shouldn’t this be up to the client? The sender’s provider delays the way this is speced out now… Design required here I think.

For multi-Block messages, the client trickles the Blocks rather than sending them all in a burst. This mitigates e2e correlation attacks that look at bursts of multiple sent/received packets, and use that information to link the sender and receiver of a multi-Block message.

5.2 Path selection algorithm

The path selection algorithm is composed of four steps:

  1. Sample all forward and SURB delays.

  2. Ensure total delays doesn’t exceed (time_till next_epoch) + 2 * epoch_duration, as keys are only published 3 epochs in advance.

  3. Pick forward and SURB mixes (Section 5.2.1).

  4. Ensure that the forward and SURB mixes have a published key that will allow them to decrypt the packet at the time of it’s expected arrival.

If either step 2 or 4 fails due to lack of keying, or excessive delay, the entire path selection process MUST be restarted from the beginning.

5.2.1 Other Path Selection Considerations

The route contains the ingress and egress providers and a sequence of randomly selected mixes. The sequence of mixes is chosen independently for each Block.

Katzenpost uses the Layered topology, thus the selected path MUST contain one and only one mix per layer, and MUST traverse all layers. Within a layer, the mix is selected with probability proportional to its bandwidth/capacity. Thus, if a mix has a fraction f of the total capacity of its layer, it will be selected with probability f.

6. E-mail Client Integration Considerations

The e-mail client is a distinct component from the mix network client because we want to avoid having to heavily modify an e-mail client just to get it to work with our mix network. Instead we outline an e-mail integration strategy below. The main functionalities of a mix network client are:

  1. send a message,

  2. download the encrypted messages stored by the egress provider,

  3. decrypt the messages using the private key (or universal private key if the client do not have a key, or if the sender didn’t know the client’s key),

  4. reassemble multi-Block messages.

6.1 Message Retrieval

A local POP service can act as the mix network client, and decrypt the final layer of Sphinx packet encryption. The K9-Mail and other e-mail clients will download plaintext e-mail from this service. In this way we avoid having to make large code changes to existing e-mail clients.

6.2 Message Sending

A local SMTP proxy will perform the Sphinx encryption; the user’s e-mail client will send messages to this local proxy. This avoids having to perform the Sphinx encryption natively in the e-mail client.

7. Client Integration Considerations

This section specifies additional design considerations other than the core reliability protocol design.

7.1 Message Retrieval

The mix network client component can utilize any of the above mentioned reliability protocol and therefore can receive:

  • a single Block message

  • a multi-Block message

7.2 Information available to clients

Clients download Mix Descriptors from the PKI, also known as the Mix Directory Authority service. More details about the PKI system and the Mix Descriptors can be found in the Katzenpost Mix Network PKI Specification.

Clients will have the following information available to them:

  • Katzenpost Mix Network Parameters via the PKI:

    • topology information,

    • packet sizes for different classes of traffic,

    • parameter of the exponential delay (lambda) for Poisson mix strategy [KESDOGAN98], [LOOPIX]

    • the list of public keys and addresses of the providers,

    • the list of public keys and addresses of the active mixes,

  • Mix Network Consensus Document containing Mix Descriptors as described in the Katzenpost Mix Network PKI Specification

  • Current mix network time via Rough Time protocol with mixes

8. Anonymity Considerations

  • The reliability protocol will allow for active confirmation attacks. [CYA2013] ARQ protocol schemes present predictable user behavior such as message retransmissions when an ACK is not received in time. A malicious Provider who can also block or delay messages destined to other Providers can get confirmation that a message did NOT originate from one or more Providers. That is, if a retransmission is received while one of the Providers was blocked, it is highly likely this is because the client who is sending the message originates from that blocked Provider. If the client sends enough new messages then the adversary can eventually perform a binary search or tree search to determine the originating Provider.

  • Between two communicating parties at least one Provider must be honest to maintain send/receiver anonymity with respect to third party observers.

  • Usage of SURBs for message ACKs present deanonymization vulnerability via compulsion attacks. Each SURB contains a Sphinx packet header which contains routing information which is encrypted with several mix public key. An adversary could compel each of these mix operators to decrypt their portion of the Sphinx header until the entire route in traced to it’s destination. Future work may build some partial defences for these attacks. [COMPULS05]

  • There is no specified defence against n-1 attacks [TRICKLE02] at this time. In future versions we may utilize heartbeat traffic to detect such attacks. [HEARTBEAT03] However these denial of service attacks are not distinguishable from packet loss due to other causes such as network congestion. In the case of congestion it would be highly suboptimal to make the network congestion worse by sending lots of decoy traffic.

  • This Provider based addressing scheme as described in [LOOPIX] is flexible enough to allow for alternate message system designs with different anonymity and security properties. In particular it should be possible to achieve strong location hiding properties.

9. Security Considerations

  • Client endpoint public keys must be distributed in order to maintain confidentiality and integrity.

10. Future Work and Research

  • specify special features and design related to near real-time chat applications using a mix network transport protocol

  • change the path selection algorithm to use legal jurisdictional region awareness for increasing the cost of compulsion attacks.

  • change path selection to use a reputation system to defend against n-1 attacks and to increate network reliability; [MIRANDA] and [MIXRELIABLE]

  • Mitigate known active confirmation attacks?

  • End to End Forward Secrecy using the Signal Double Ratchet

  • make bulk transfers go faster using Selective Repeat ARQ and Go-Back-N ARQ

  • make bulk transfers go faster using forward error correction

  • make bulk transfers go faster using an alternate communications channel such as Tor-loops or similar decoy traffic protocol that uses Tor.

Appendix A. References

Appendix A.1 Normative References


Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels”, BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.


Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, “The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2”, RFC 5246, DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.


Resnick, P., Ed., “Internet Message Format”, RFC 5322, DOI 10.17487/RFC5322, October 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5322>.


Perrin, T., “The Noise Protocol Framework”, May 2017, <https://noiseprotocol.org/noise.pdf>.


Angel, Y., Danezis, G., Diaz, C., Piotrowska, A., Stainton, D., “Katzenpost Mix Network Specification”, June 2017, <https://github.com/Katzenpost/docs/blob/master/specs/mixnet.rst>.


Angel, Y., Piotrowska, A., Stainton, D., “Katzenpost Mix Network Public Key Infrastructure Specification”, December 2017, <https://github.com/katzenpost/docs/blob/master/specs/pki.rst>.


Angel, Y. “Katzenpost Mix Network Wire Protocol Specification”, June 2017, <https://github.com/Katzenpost/docs/blob/master/specs/wire-protocol.rst>.

Appendix A.2 Informative References


Angel, Y., Danezis, G., Diaz, C., Piotrowska, A., Stainton, D., “Sphinx Mix Network Cryptographic Packet Format Specification” July 2017, <https://github.com/katzenpost/docs/blob/master/specs/sphinx.rst>.


Danezis, G., Goldberg, I., “Sphinx: A Compact and Provably Secure Mix Format”, DOI 10.1109/SP.2009.15, May 2009, <https://cypherpunks.ca/~iang/pubs/Sphinx_Oakland09.pdf>.


Geddes, J., Schuchard, M., Hopper, N., “Cover Your ACKs: Pitfalls of CovertChannel Censorship Circumvention”, <https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~hopper/ccs13-cya.pdf>.


Danezis, G., Clulow, J., “Compulsion Resistant Anonymous Communications”, Proceedings of Information Hiding Workshop, June 2005, <https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/ih05-danezisclulow.pdf>.


Danezis, G., Sassaman, L., “Heartbeat Traffic to Counter (n-1) Attacks”, Proceedings of the Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, October 2003, <https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/danezis:wpes2003.pdf>.


Serjantov, A., Dingledine, R., Syverson, P., “From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types”, Proceedings of Information Hiding Workshop, October 2002, <https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/trickle02.pdf>.


Jacobson, V., Karels, M., “Congestion Avoidance and Control”, Symposium proceedings on Communications architectures and protocols, November 1988, <http://ee.lbl.gov/papers/congavoid.pdf>.


Kelly, F., “Stochastic Models of Computer Communication Systems”, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 1985, <http://www.yaroslavvb.com/papers/notes/kelly-stochastic.pdf>.


Nagle, J., “Congestion Control in IP/TCP Internetworks”, January 1984, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc896>.


Kesdogan, D., Egner, J., and Büschkes, R., “Stop-and-Go-MIXes Providing Probabilistic Anonymity in an Open System.” Information Hiding, 1998.


Piotrowska, A., Hayes, J., Elahi, T., Meiser, S., Danezis, G., “The Loopix Anonymity System”, USENIX, August, 2017 <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1703.00536.pdf>


Leibowitz, H., Piotrowska, A., Danezis, G., Herzberg, A., 2017, “No right to ramain silent: Isolating Malicious Mixes” <https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1000.pdf>.


Dingledine, R., Freedman, M., Hopwood, D., Molnar, D., 2001 “A Reputation System to Increase MIX-Net Reliability” In Information Hiding, 4th International Workshop <https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/mix-acc.pdf>.

Appendix B. Citing This Document

Appendix B.1 Bibtex Entry

Note that the following bibtex entry is in the IEEEtran bibtex style as described in a document called “How to Use the IEEEtran BIBTEX Style”.

title = {Katzenpost Mix Network End-to-end Protocol Specification},
author = {Yawning Angel and George Danezis and Claudia Diaz and Ania Piotrowska and David Stainton},
url = {https://github.com/Katzenpost/docs/blob/master/specs/end_to_end.rst},
year = {2017}